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Andrew Judge, Tomas Maltby and Kacper Szulecki  
 
1. Introduction 
 
What are the implications of linking ‘energy’ and ‘security’?  The preceding chapters have all 
sought to examine the interaction between these two seemingly distinctive realms. They have 
done so in variety of productive ways that demonstrate both the potential of utilizing 
securitization theory for analyzing what happens when energy is constructed as a security issue, 
and the limitations of the canonical Copenhagen School framework when it is applied to energy 
issues. One of the key insights, originally argued in chapter 2 and developed empirically in 
chapters 3-5, is that the use of the term ‘energy security’ is not synonymous with ‘energy 
securitization’, at least in how the latter term is conventionally understood. This suggests that 
if the promise of energy securitization research is to be fulfilled, it is necessary to have a clearer 
sense of where further research in this area should focus.   
This chapter suggests areas where researchers interested in the social construction of 
energy as a security issue may want to focus their attention. It does so through both an 
examination of what Securitization Studies could learn from the study of energy issues (not 
least the chapters in this volume) and what insights could be drawn from theoretical 
developments within Securitization Studies for the study of energy security. This chapter is 
structured into three sections. The first provides a brief overview of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Copenhagen School framework when it is applied to energy issues, drawing 
on some of the key insights from the preceding chapters and critiques from across the broader 
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field of Securitization Studies. The second section outlines two possible avenues for future 
research that focus on the discursive construction of energy security – an examination of 
whether energy is a distinct ‘sector’ of security, and whether there are alternative logics of 
security that depart from the Copenhagen School understanding of securitization. The third and 
final section adopts a different approach, focusing on the process of securitization and outlining 
some of the insights that can be drawn from so-called ‘sociological’ understandings of 
securitization.  
 
2. Energy Security and the Copenhagen School: Strengths and Limitations  
 
As demonstrated in chapters 3–5, the Copenhagen School framework has some important 
strengths. It has proven to be particularly useful in situations in which actors connect aspects 
of energy policy to issues of national (military) security. This stems primarily from the central 
idea of the Copenhagen School – that the concept of security ‘means’ something distinctive 
which can be examined in a variety of situations: 
 
“The answer to what makes something an international security issue can be found in 
the traditional military-political understanding of security. In this context, security is 
about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a 
designated referent object […] The special nature of security threats justifies the use of 
extraordinary measures to handle them” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde., 1998: 21). 
 
This is, in short, a classic Realist understanding of security based on a traditional conception 
of national (military) security. While the Copenhagen School are clear that the, “essential 
quality of existence will vary greatly across different sectors and levels of analysis [and] 
therefore, so will the nature of existential threats” they nonetheless consider security to have a 
distinct meaning (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 21-22). This definitional clarity has a 
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clear methodological advantage – it provides analysts with an explicit standard to compare the 
discourse of potential securitizing actors against (Williams, 2011). 
Based on this definition, energy researchers have a powerful tool for distinguishing 
‘energy security’ as a relatively neutral policy goal, from ‘energy security’ as a rally-around-
the-flag performative, meant to mobilize an audience and transcend regular political practice. 
This distinction between the word ‘security’ and what the Copenhagen School refer to as the 
‘grammar’ or ‘logic’ of security, is clear in the analogy drawn by Poland’s defense minister 
Radek Sikorski between the Nord Stream pipeline deal and the Hitler-Stalin pact (see chapters 
by both Heinrich and Siddi in this volume). 
It is also important to recognize that the Copenhagen School, with its roots in the 
experience of the Cold War peace movement, combines this methodological tool with a 
normative vantage point in its assertion that transforming something into a security issue has 
the political consequence of removing an issue from normal democratic politics (Buzan, 
Wæver, and de Wilde., 1998: 29). It therefore constitutes a powerful tool for critical energy 
security studies. If we consider that ‘extraordinary measures’ and ‘exceptional politics’ tend to 
mean the removal of energy issues from public oversight, a number of critical questions come 
to mind. Who does, and who should, exercise power in governing the energy sector? To what 
extent is securitization and expert insulation of energy security democratically acceptable? 
Moreover, qui bono (Karyotis and Skleparis, 2013)? Who benefits and what is there to be 
gained by making something – a gas pipeline for example – a security issue to be addressed by 
extraordinary measures? 
Emphasizing the national/military logic of security and examining these fundamentally 
political concerns have a further benefit – as a useful means of integrating energy into Security 
Studies. As argued in various chapters in this volume, energy security has proven challenging 
for many International Relations and Security Studies researchers to grasp and understand. One 
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of the clear advantages of the Copenhagen School framework is that it offers a way for these 
fields to engage with energy issues in a more nuanced way than the traditional ‘strategic 
resources’ and ‘oil wars’ literatures. This is important because these literatures have very little 
to say about the relative importance of different vital energy systems, and are incapable of 
understanding the construction of security vulnerabilities in ways other than those articulated 
by policymakers. Instead, the Copenhagen School framework offers a means of problematizing 
individual energy policy decisions and, indeed, denaturalizing whole energy policy paradigms. 
This is something which is developed in the second part of this volume, particularly by Szulecki 
and Westphal, and Kustova and Landry, where the authors draw on securitization and other 
Critical Security Studies’ concepts to look beyond the established ‘facts’ of energy policy and 
taken for granted assumptions about the factors that shape energy security. 
There are, however, important limitations to the Copenhagen School that must be 
acknowledged. Even if we can praise the methodological clarity and critical edge that the 
framework brings to energy issues, the model can be very rigid and constraining. The fact that 
the authors of the preceding chapters had to adjust the framework, loosening it in some places 
and operationalizing it more strictly elsewhere, shows just how constraining this approach can 
be when applied to energy issues. Similar problems have been found when the framework has 
been utilized in other non-traditional areas of security. There are three questions in particular 
which help to demonstrate this core limitation. 
First, what counts as a securitizing move? Does this have to be an explicit security 
utterance?  Does the threat need to be existential and undermining the physical survival of a 
referent object?  Such ambiguities are clear in the above example of Sikorski’s speech about 
the Nord Stream pipeline. In that particular speech, it is notable that the word ‘security’ is not 
used, nor is there a direct claim about the Nord Stream pipeline deal constituting an ‘existential 
threat’ to Poland’s survival. Yet the link between energy and national/military security is clear. 
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Moreover, there are numerous other examples from the same time period where Polish 
government officials claimed that energy was a ‘weapon’ that was a ‘threat’ to national security 
(Judge and Maltby, 2017: 195-197). Is this a case of concept stretching, or does any utterance 
of security have the potential to securitize an issue, regardless of whether or not it follows the 
Copenhagen School’s logic of security (Huysmans 2002)? 
Second, does securitization only occur if extraordinary measures are subsequently 
enacted?  In chapter 2, Heinrich and Szulecki proposed a distinction between security jargon 
and securitization proper, the former merely referring to threats to the referent objects but not 
proposing concrete measures at all – either extraordinary or ‘normal’. The empirical chapters, 
especially by Heinrich as well as Kusznir and Szulecki, have shown how problematic that 
distinction can be in practice, especially since framing security and identifying threats can 
influence the broader discursive and political context in which energy policy decisions are 
taken. Within the poststructuralist approach of the Copenhagen School it becomes very 
difficult to justify a distinction between securitization jargon and securitization proper, because 
the implicit causal link between a securitizing move and audience acceptance of extraordinary 
measures is not sustainable. On the other hand, the way an increasingly securitized political 
debate remolds actors’ identities and perceptions becomes paramount – blurring the conceptual 
distinction proposed by Heinrich and Szulecki. 
Third, what counts as extraordinary?  Can this be decided a priori, or is it dependent 
on the particular situation in which actors find themselves?  In this volume, extraordinary 
measures were categorized based on three types of action: (1) breaking norms (which are 
explicit or implicit prescriptions about ‘how things are done’); (2) shifting competences and 
power towards the executive or a specialized agency; and (3) withholding or limiting 
information. Any one or a combination of these can be seen as ‘extraordinary measures’ if they 
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are legitimized by reference to security, however this might not cover the full range of measures 
that go beyond the bounds of ‘normal politics’.  
 
3. Sectors and Logics of Energy Security  
 
This overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the Copenhagen School suggests that 
although the framework can be useful for examining constructions of energy security, it will 
often be necessary to go beyond a strict and rigid application of its core concepts. In particular, 
it is worth considering whether the Copenhagen School’s core logic of security is the most 
appropriate means of conceptualizing securitization. In this section, we focus on two possible 
ways of examining the development of (energy) security discourses that build on, but also 
deviate from, the Copenhagen School – sectors of security, and logics of security. 
 
3.1 Sectors of Security 
Sectors are an important element of the Copenhagen School, yet they have received remarkably 
little attention within Securitization Studies as a whole.1  This is surprising because the majority 
of Security: A New Framework for Analysis is devoted to an examination of how securitization 
plays out within five distinct sectors – military, economic, political, environmental and societal. 
These sectors are conceptualized as “lenses or discourses rather than objectively existing 
phenomena […] defined by particular constitutions of referent objects and types of threats as 
well as by specific forms or ‘grammars’ of securitization” (1998: 27). As discussed in the 
previous section, these ‘grammars’ mean that although there is one national/military logic of 
                                                     
1 The other theory that is examined with the Copenhagen School’s 1998 book is Regional Security Complex 
Theory. Space precludes a discussion of this theory, however there has been some interesting work on how a 
regional security complex centred around energy supplies has emerged between the EU and Russia (Kirchner 
and Berk, 2010; Maltby, 2015). There is clear potential for further work in this area in light of developments 
since the 2009 gas supply disruption. 
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security, the ‘essential quality of existence’ can differ between sectors. This also has an impact 
on the “specific types of interaction” between actors within each sector: 
 
“The military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is 
about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector 
is about relationships of trade, production and finance; the societal sector is about 
relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships 
between human activity and the biosphere” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde., 1998: 7) 
 
The obvious question to ask at this point is: what sector(s) can energy be situated within? The 
Copenhagen School treat energy as a ‘tradable good on the global market’ and therefore as an 
economic referent object. Such an interpretation is problematic however, because it reduces 
energy to oil, and energy security to concerns about oil supplies. This is largely a function of 
how energy issues entered International Relations in the first place. International Political 
Economy was, as Hancock and Vivoda argue, “a field born of the OPEC crisis” (2014: 206) 
which largely reduced the discussion of energy to oil, and viewed energy supply shortages as 
a problem which could best be addressed through the spread of liberal market norms. When 
we consider that the Copenhagen School largely rule out the possibility of securitizing 
economic issues under such a liberal world view, it is clear that such a perspective can be 
limiting and may fail to get to the heart of how energy securitization functions (Judge and 
Maltby, 2017: 185). 
Others have used the concept of sectors more productively when examining energy 
issues. Natorski and Herranz-Surrallés (2008) argue that energy is a cross-cutting issue which 
could potentially be examined within each of the five sectors. Christou and Amadides (2013) 
go one step further, arguing that the sector within which energy is securitized has consequences 
for the kind of political effects that it generates. Such approaches open up the possibility of 
different sector-specific grammars of security playing a role in how energy is constructed as a 
security issue. For instance, if energy is securitized as an ‘environmental’ issue then the focus 
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may be on mitigating the damaging effects of burning fossil fuels, whereas if it is securitized 
as a ‘military’ issue then the focus may be on the potential for external suppliers of a resource 
to coerce a state. 
There is, however, another possibility worth considering – that energy should be viewed 
as a distinct sector of security. Such a development is not without precedent. Hansen and 
Nissenbaum (2009) argue that ‘cyber security’ should be regarded as a distinct sector, 
constituted by a unique configuration of referent objects and threats. A similar attempt could 
be made in the case of energy security. One of the benefits of such an approach is that rather 
than ultimately reducing energy to other sectors, this places the question of what, if anything, 
is specific about energy security at the forefront of our analysis. 
In terms of referent objects, there has been a tendency to view energy supplies as the 
core referent object within claims about energy security. Such an approach is understandable, 
but is often based on a misunderstanding about what referent objects are, i.e. “things that are 
seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan, Wæver, 
and de Wilde., 1998: 36). In many cases where energy is being ‘securitized’, it is not the energy 
supplies that have the legitimate claim to survival. Instead, they are the means through which 
survival of some other referent object is secured. This similarly applies to other common 
objects such as energy demand, infrastructure and prices. Bridge (2015) makes this point when 
he identifies three ‘logics’ of energy security: sovereign state security, population security, and 
vital systems security. Each of these logics is based around different referent objects: states, 
societies and energy systems. The first two objects could ultimately be traced back to other 
sectors – military/political and societal respectively. Energy systems cannot, however, and if 
we follow Cherp and Jewell in defining energy security in terms of the “low vulnerability of 
vital energy systems” (2014: 415) then this may provide a basis for a distinct security sector 
with its own forms of interaction. 
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Supply interruptions may constitute the main threat to such systems; however, the 
sources of such threats and the degree of harm they cause may vary. A temporary blackout in 
the power grid, an inadequate supply of gas during a cold winter, volatile prices disrupting the 
economic rationale for different energy sources, or a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant 
are all threats to energy security, but all have different real impacts on energy systems.  
What we mean by ‘energy systems’ is fundamental for whether we can entertain the 
possibility of energy as a distinct sector. Cherp and Jewell define these as “resources, materials, 
infrastructure, technologies, markets and other elements connected to each other stronger than 
they are connected to the outside world” (2013: 151). The idea that energy systems are a set of 
distinctive referent objects means that we can disentangle securitizing moves that refer 
specifically to these systems from moves about other objects (e.g. framing ‘negative’ energy 
prices as a threat to national security might actually refer to the economic sector; securitizing 
greenhouse gas emissions as a major cause of climate change might refer to the environmental 
sector etc.) This helps to maintain the normative edge of securitization studies, by helping to 
specify which vulnerabilities can – intentionally or not – be exaggerated. Moreover, the 
perception and treatment of an energy system as ‘vital’ could be a prerequisite for its 
securitization. This suggests that one avenue for future empirical research would be to examine 
which energy systems are considered ‘vital’ and why. This is an avenue where some of the 
empirical studies in this volume have already made some progress. 
 
3.2 Logics of Security 
Regardless of whether energy is regarded as a distinctive sector or not, another promising 
avenue is to examine what logics of security are most common in attempts to securitize energy. 
Logics of security go beyond a focus on referent objects and threats, to examine what may be 
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termed the underlying rationality embedded within a security discourse.2  Rather than reducing 
all security discourses to sector-specific variations on the Copenhagen School logic of 
existential threats that lead to extraordinary measures and political action, they open up the 
possibility of alternative logics that deviate from an exclusive focus on existential threats to 
survival. These could take the form of general logics of security that are applicable to multiple 
sectors, or logics that are specific features of a sector and may indeed strengthen the case for 
considering that sector as distinct from others. We consider both these options below. 
The idea that there may be other general logics of security is at the core of many 
critiques of the Copenhagen School. In particular, the Paris School have criticized the 
Copenhagen School for privileging an understanding of security which is derived from how 
the term has been used in the realm of ‘international security’ to the exclusion of meanings 
derived from the field of internal security, where the policing of risks and vulnerabilities have 
arguably been more prevalent (Bigo, 2002). Risk is perhaps the most notable alternative to a 
Realist logic of security because, as Williams argues, since the end of the Cold War, western 
security policies and institutions have become increasingly orientated towards the management 
of risks rather than the elimination of existential threats to survival (Williams, 2008). The 
policies adopted during the War on Terror are frequently cited as examples of constructing and 
dealing with insecurity, through precautionary actions to insure against potential harm and 
increase the resilience of political systems (Rasmussen, 2004; van Munster, 2005; De Goode, 
2008).  
Corry argues that such security constructions and policies can be understood as part of 
a distinct logic of riskification, which focuses on indirect causes of harm that put the 
governability of referent objects at risk, in contrast to the focus of the Copenhagen School on 
                                                     
2 Although as noted above, Bridge (2015) refers to different logics of state, population and vital systems 
security, his primary concern is with the different referent objects that these entail rather than alternative 
security rationalities. 
11 
 
direct threats to the survival of a referent object (Corry, 2012). Such a logic leads in a different 
policy direction than existential threats towards, “programmes for permanent changes aimed 
at reducing vulnerability and boosting the governance-capacity of the valued referent object 
itself” (ibid. 248). A logic of riskification may, at least at a discursive level, more accurately 
describe the form that security constructions take within the energy sector, although this is 
fundamentally an empirical question (Judge and Maltby, 2017: 183; Lis in this volume).  
Examining whether energy security is constructed in terms of existential threats or risks in 
different contexts, may allow for a more accurate account of what kind of security concern 
energy is regarded as in different contexts. 
That being said, drawing a sharp distinction between these two logics is not without its 
problems. It makes the somewhat questionable assumption that risk can be reduced to a single 
essence – the very same problem with the Copenhagen School’s logic of security. Risk is, of 
course, a much more complex and varied concept than this implies (Petersen, 2012), as are 
risk-related concepts such as ‘resilience’ (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 2011; Bourbeau, 
2013). This could be viewed as a key avenue for future research on energy 
securitization/riskification – an examination of how risk is constructed in various contexts. 
Indeed, because of the prevalence of risk-related discourses and practices within the energy 
sector, it could serve as a useful empirical site for developing how the concept of risk is 
understood within Security Studies. 
Rather than deductively applying general logics to the energy sector, an alternative 
approach would be to examine inductively how security is constructed within the energy sector 
itself. This would make it possible to develop a more empirically grounded understanding of 
what energy security signifies in different contexts, or to highlight the contested nature of 
energy security within those contexts. The most fully developed attempt at such an analysis is 
by Ciută, who has examined the various ways in which the concept of energy security is used 
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by academic researchers and political organizations. He distils these into three distinct logics 
of energy security, which involve different configurations of threats, political values, policy 
measures and forms of political action – war, subsistence and total/banal security. 
The logic of war portrays energy as, “a cause or an instrument of war or conflict” (Ciută, 
2010: 129). It includes constructions of energy as a weapon that can be deployed against 
dependent consumer states, as well as the idea of resource wars or as an indirect cause of 
conflict through environmental degradation, political strife within states and competition for 
resources. It is an inherently geopolitical, and often militarized, understanding of security that 
involves a distinct rationality of political action based on the application of strategic and 
military thinking to energy issues. It therefore involves the subordination of the concerns of 
various actors to the geopolitical objectives of the state. 
The logic of subsistence in contrast, views energy as a public good which people need 
rather than being bound up in war and conflict. Such a need, “is not driven by the imperative 
to survive, but by the functional demands of various sectors of activity, which means its 
absence does not lead to extinction, but to dysfunction” (Ibidem: 132). Moreover, because it is 
a public good it involves a wide range of actors across different fuel types (gas, nuclear, wind, 
solar, etc.), and sectors of activity (production, transport, etc.). As a result, the specific meaning 
of energy security can vary substantially between these actors due to their different levels of 
involvement. Perhaps more importantly, it also does not result in a particular type of policy 
response because, “energy security policies [are] non-specific as security policies. If market 
failure is the key problem for energy security, then the solution is application of generic policies 
designed to improve market functionality” (Ibidem: 134, emphasis in original).  
Finally, the logic of total or banal security is an extreme extension of the previous logic. 
Because energy is an essential public good that involves such a plurality of actors, there are a 
huge number of potential threats to different aspects of energy supply, and potentially every 
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actor can be called upon to change their behaviors to increase security. This in turn leads to 
investing, “every single object of any kind with and in security”, resulting in the “security of 
everything…everywhere…against everything” (Ibidem: 134). 
As Ciută notes, both the logics of subsistence and total security overlap with a risk-
based approach to security (see Heinrich and Szulecki in this volume). Likewise, a logic of war 
overlaps quite clearly with the Copenhagen School logic of security. Ciută’s logics are, 
however, more nuanced than either of these two approaches, and more likely to capture the 
specific dynamics of the energy sector. The extent to which these logics can be identified in 
attempts to securitize energy would, moreover, lend even greater support to the idea that energy 
represents a distinct sector of security composed of different referent objects, threats and logics. 
Examining whether this is the case should be a major focus of future research on energy 
securitization. 
4. The Process of Securitization: Audiences, Context and Causality 
 
So far, we have examined alternative ways in which discourses of energy security can be 
analyzed, through sectors and logics of security. While such avenues are undoubtedly worth 
pursuing, a focus on discourse risks losing sight of the fact that securitization is an inherently 
social process. Many critiques of the Copenhagen School have sought to address this 
shortcoming, which has led to various sustained efforts at rethinking major elements of the 
theory that have pushed the field it in a more ‘sociological’ direction.   
‘Sociological’ approaches place a far greater emphasis on the process of securitization.  
Such approaches, which are often contrasted with the ‘philosophical’ approach of the 
Copenhagen School (and Corry’s riskification framework), downplay the performative force 
of speech acts uttered by securitizing actors and instead engage in a deeper examination of the 
role that audiences and contextual factors play in shaping this process.  As Balzacq argues: 
14 
 
 
“securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) process that occurs 
within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the 
psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and 
listener bring to the interaction […] Securitization can be discursive and non-
discursive; intentional and non-intentional; performative but not ‘an act in itself’” 
(Balzacq, 2010b: 1-2, emphasis added). 
 
Within this understanding of securitization, discourses of security remain central but they are 
also not theorized according to a simple sender-receiver model of communication between an 
empowered securitizing actor and a passively recipient audience. Instead, they are influenced 
by the circumstances within which this communication occurs. In other words, both the social 
interaction of actors and audiences and the context features of the situation in question. In this 
section, we focus on these two features before returning to an issue raised in the first section 
of this chapter – what this means for whether or not we should regard securitization as a causal 
theory. 
4.1 Audiences 
The most obvious way in which most sociological approaches depart from the Copenhagen 
School is in their more extensive theorization of ‘audiences’. Their central insight is that 
although particular authoritative actors may be dominant in some circumstances, in many cases 
securitization success or failure will be a result of a network effect based on the dispositions 
of, and power relations between, multiple securitizing actors and audiences. As a result, 
audiences should be regarded as the central actors in the securitizing process, because 
ultimately their acceptance or rejection of securitizing moves will be decisive in whether 
securitization is successful or not (Balzacq, 2010a: 8-11). 
Shifting the focus of analysis from securitizing actors to audiences could be a 
particularly useful research strategy when examining energy securitization because in the 
energy sector multiple actors beyond ‘the state’ may claim the right to ‘speak security’ and 
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deliberations among these actors are likely to lead to different conceptions of energy security 
than standard or alternative logics of energy security would suggest.  Indeed, Ciutǎ (2010) 
argues that one of the defining features of the logics of subsistence and total security identified 
in the previous section is that they are constituted by a plurality of actors/audiences who are 
involved across multiple sectors of activity. There are at least two areas where analysts may 
then want to focus their attention. 
First, by differentiating between different types of audience that play a role in the 
securitization process. In various empirical studies of securitization across a wide range of 
issue areas and types of political system, it is clear that there is no single ‘type’ of audience 
that is always the most important for accepting or rejecting securitizing moves. Wæver himself 
has acknowledged that the lack of differentiation between types of audience is a shortcoming 
of the Copenhagen School framework, not least because what counts as a ‘relevant’ audience 
will differ between sectors and contexts (2003: 25). Identifying such audiences can be difficult 
because, as Vuori argues, audiences have different abilities to, “provide the securitizing actor 
with whatever s/he is seeking to accomplish with the securitization” (2008: 72). An important 
step, however, is to develop a clearer understanding about what types of audience could in 
principle ‘matter’ in concrete situations. One attempt by Salter (2008) distinguishes between 
popular, elite, technocratic and scientific audiences. These categories are derived from the 
specific field of airport security, but are designed to be general enough to apply to a variety of 
security issues across sectors. One of the core questions for analysts of energy securitization is 
whether these categories are appropriate or if alternative categorizations, perhaps incorporating 
military, economic, and activist audiences, would be more suitable.  
Second, by paying greater attention to power relations between securitizing actors and 
audiences. Not only do different audiences play different roles, they also have different kinds 
of relationship with securitizing actors. These are structured by both formal and informal power 
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relations, which, in most cases, pre-date attempts at securitization and are often 
institutionalized within particular political systems even if one of the possible outcomes of 
securitization is that those power relations are subject to change. The relations between actors 
and audiences should not be understood in a static and unidirectional manner, where a 
securitizing actor has the power to compel or influence different audiences to varying degrees. 
Instead, it is important to recognize, as Côté (2016) argues, that audiences are active agents 
that can contest, develop, and potentially transform securitizing moves in a process of 
deliberation. Rather than being passive recipients of securitizing moves, audiences have 
agency, and there is no reason to assume that securitizing actors will always get their own way.  
A key task for future research on energy securitization is to pay greater attention to the power 
relations between securitizing actors and different types of audience.  
There are significant methodological challenges involved in measuring audience 
acceptance. How do we know if a given securitizing move is accepted by the expert community 
and the society at large? This question is of fundamental importance to all causally oriented 
and explanatory studies of securitization, but there are no easy answers. Rather than focusing 
on the acceptance of a single move, however, we can approach the question slightly differently. 
Instead, one can look at the wider acceptability of expressing energy issues in the language of 
security and applying extraordinary, non-political measures outside democratic control to the 
energy sector. To grasp the acceptability of a securitizing move – understood as the willingness 
of a relevant audience to agree on a securitizing frame – we need to disentangle securitization 
as a process that takes place in a broader context, both material and ideational, which is difficult 
to change with individual speech acts (McDonald, 2008). Thus, by studying discourses 
dominant in the energy sector, security imaginaries or other intersubjective structures of 
meaning, we can establish whether certain audiences are more or less prone to accepting 
securitizing moves.  
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An example of moving energy security studies in that direction is perhaps the research 
of Fischhendler et al. (2015). They point to the fundamental importance of national security 
discourses that dominate other debates, serving as a reservoir of narratives and rhetorical 
commonplaces that spark securitization in areas far from usual security concerns. These 
observations are very important for studying energy securitization beyond the usual “high 
politics” of oil and gas, but also for understanding different securitization modes in these 
sectors. That is in turn illustrated by Fischhendler and Nathan’s (2014) study of Israeli natural 
gas exports as an issue of “national security”. Together with Casier (2011), Godzimirski 
(2009), Judge, et al. (2016) as well as Siddi in this volume,  and echoing Guzzini’s (2012) and 
colleagues’ analyses of the “return of geopolitics”, Fischhendler et al. provide us with much 
food for thought about how securitization of different issues – including energy policy – seems 
to be facilitated in some contexts while it is less probable in others. 
4.2 Context 
It is clear that securitization does not occur in a vacuum, but within a social situation that 
undoubtedly shapes the manner in which this process unfolds. This is not reducible to the 
relationship between securitizing actor and audience(s), but can involve factors ranging from 
proximate features of the particular ‘setting’ where securitization occurs, to more distant 
elements such as political, economic and cultural environments (Balzacq, 2010b: 37). This 
poses additional methodological challenges for analysts, because it is impossible to account for 
the influence of every single contextual factor on any social process.  It should, however, be 
possible to identify some of the most important factors within particular sectors of security by 
focusing on relatively stable features or characteristics of the major referent objects. This is the 
approach taken by Judge and Maltby (2017), who argue that in the energy sector there are at 
least two sets of relevant contextual factors that can be derived from the observation that energy 
is a socio-technical system – technical and political-economic (see also Szulecki 2016). 
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Technical factors – or to use language drawing on Bruno Latour (2005) – the materiality 
of energy systems, are concerned with what is often referred to as the ‘geography’ and 
‘hardware’. Judge and Maltby describe these as: 
 
“an assemblage of a particular mix of fuels in overall consumption and electricity 
production, the sources of these supplies (imported/domestic), established roles for 
particular types of energy in particular economic sectors, and a configuration of 
physical infrastructure including the capacity to import, produce and transmit” (2017: 
184).  
 
However, it is important to not simply view technical factors as ‘material facts’ which place 
hard limits on the kinds of discourses and social dynamics that are possible. Discourses about 
energy, regardless of whether they embody claims about security, or not, all represent the 
elements of this space and materiality in various ways. However, their representations are also 
constituted by these material conditions. While a state can claim that it wants to be energy 
independent regardless of whether it has the physical resources to do so, these material 
conditions also play a role in the plausibility, sustainability and contestability of these claims. 
As is often observed, transformations of energy systems are highly path-dependent social 
processes, as changes through the development of new generation or transit infrastructure are 
often difficult, time-consuming and expensive (Stirling, 2014). 
Political-economic factors, by contrast, are concerned with the conditions under which 
energy is produced, traded, and used, and how those activities are regulated (Judge and Maltby, 
2017: 184). Dannreuther similarly argues that political economy, “has a determining effect on 
which particular securitization of energy assumes dominance” (2015: 467), and that “what 
actually gets securitized is decisively shaped by material power relations” (2015: 468). While 
this may be too deterministic a reading, it is nonetheless important to examine how pre-
established structural conditions may play a role in shaping the form, dissemination and success 
or failure of securitization. At a minimum, the power relations between actors are shaped by 
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their positions and roles within a particular political economic system. However this type of 
contextual factor goes further, by focusing on how systems of energy governance structure 
actor interactions in ways that are not reducible to power relations. They include norms, policy 
paradigms, and institutionalized systems of regulation that together constitute the “rules of the 
game” (Kuzemko, et al., 2016; Belyi and Talus 2015).  
Judge and Maltby distinguish between two main systems of energy governance: 
‘market-led governance’ based on a deregulated economy in which market participants are the 
primary actors; and ‘state-led governance’ based on tightly regulated economy in which 
markets are subservient to the political objectives of the state (2017: 184-185). These are, of 
course, somewhat crude ideal types and future research in Energy Studies as a whole would do 
well to better differentiate between systems of energy governance. Moreover, it is not clear 
that systems of energy governance are confined to the internal political economy of a state. 
Multilateral and supranational institutions also play a structuring role, as do the ways in which 
international actors of all kinds pursue their foreign policies. In a recent article, Prontera (2017) 
argues that in Southeastern Europe there have been three forms of ‘state model’ in the gas 
sector, which he associates with different patterns of energy diplomacy: partner states, provider 
states and catalytic states. The latter is particularly interesting, as it combines a network form 
of energy diplomacy with an active role for government within a market structure. This would 
suggest that future research should develop more precise and nuanced conceptualizations of 
systems of energy governance, as a first step towards examining what role they place in the 
process of securitization. 
4.3 From audiences and context to securitization ‘dynamics’ 
Our discussion of ‘sociological’ approaches has focused primarily on paying greater attention 
to key factors that were undertheorized in the Copenhagen School’s original securitization 
framework. What has not been examined is the way in which sociological approaches 
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understand causality. More precisely, what are the implications of shifting from a mainly 
poststructuralist understanding of securitization (performative speech acts) to a more 
sociological approach in which multiple factors may potentially have an influence on the 
securitization process? This may seem like a somewhat abstract question, but it actually goes 
to the heart of what distinguishes sociological approaches from the Copenhagen School and 
other philosophical approaches. It also has major implications for future research on energy 
securitization and the wider field of Securitization Studies, because empirical research that is 
unclear about its methodological assumptions is likely to be logically inconsistent and 
potentially flawed (Jackson, 2010). 
The Copenhagen School have a somewhat ambiguous understanding of causality. On 
the one hand, from a soft constructivist standpoint, they outline a causal sequence: securitizing 
move, acceptance by an audience, creation of a platform where the adoption of extraordinary 
measures becomes possible. This is the approach adopted by Heinrich and Szulecki when 
building the framework for the empirical studies presented in chapters 3-5. This causal 
sequence is what allows securitization theory to be considered an explanatory theory – the 
completion of all these steps leads to successful securitization and the production of substantial 
political effects. On the other hand, from a poststructuralist standpoint, the Copenhagen School 
cannot meaningfully develop such a causal sequence because discourses are unstable and 
incomplete structures of meaning which cannot be traced back to a set of initial causes. 
Moreover, they are constitutive of social action rather than being distinct from such actions, 
and therefore cannot be said to ‘cause’ the substantial political effects that are associated with 
securitization. This tension between understanding the Copenhagen School framework as a 
causal or constitutive theory is at the heart of Heinrich and Szulecki’s distinction between 
securitization jargon and securitization proper in chapter 2. 
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Sociological approaches attempt to resolve this tension by developing a different 
understanding of causality. Balzacq, for instance, in pushing securitization theory away from 
a focus on the ‘security speech act’, argues that a causally deterministic account of 
securitization is untenable. Instead, he proposes that researchers investigate the, “degree of 
congruence between different circumstances driving and/or constraining securitization” 
(Balzacq, 2010a: 18). This makes sense if we consider that under a sociological understanding, 
multiple actors and audiences may be involved in deliberations about whether something is a 
security issue or not and what that means, while these interactions will be shaped by the full 
range of contextual factors identified above. This is why Balzacq views these various factors 
as part of a “network of causality”, which it is the task of analysts to examine rather than 
assuming there is a single factor which is causally significant to the exclusion of others (ibid., 
18).  
An alternative and more sophisticated approach to understanding causality comes from 
Guzzini (2011), who suggests that there may be value in reconceptualizing securitization as a 
‘social mechanism’ as a sounder basis for viewing it as an explanatory theory. Balzacq has also 
used the terminology of ‘mechanisms’, by which he means the processes of persuasion, 
propaganda, learning, and socialization that may be involved in the process of securitization 
(2015: 106). That idea is somewhat debatable however, as it would either make securitization 
a mechanism of some higher echelon – a kind of “molecular mechanism” to use Elster’s  term 
(2007: 42-44)– or an unspecified theoretical construct that is reducible to more foundational 
mechanisms.3 Guzzini develops a richer account of securitization as a social mechanism, based 
on the understanding of mechanisms as focused on ‘how’ causality rather than the ‘what’ 
                                                     
3 In much the same way as Schelling proposed that “theory may comprise many social mechanisms, but also a 
social mechanism may comprise many theories” (1998: 33). 
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causality of correlational analysis (including Balzacq’s examination of the congruence of 
different forces). 
‘How’ causality allows for the analysis of action “embedded in a process that, despite 
its focus on structures (security imaginaries, identity discourses, cultures of anarchy), 
institutional processes and their path dependencies, is basically open, since it is contingent on 
a series of contexts and factors” (Guzzini 2013: 276). This opens new spaces for re-
constructing securitization as an explanatory theory, which can account for certain outcomes 
and explain the causal pathways that lead there. His article can be read both as a plea for critical 
realist or analyticist reframing of securitization.  
Two important points have to be made clear. Firstly, both Guzzini’s “mechanismic” 
securitization and Balzacq’s “sociological” securitization move the emphasis away from the 
securitizing speech act. Guzzini suggests that “the idea of a speech act refers here to a process, 
not a kind of single bombshell event” (2011: 334). The latter seems to have been the most 
common misinterpretation of the initial theorization by the Copenhagen School scholars – and 
one with far reaching consequences. In a similar vein, Balzacq does not mention the actual 
speech act among the “essentials” of his ideal type of securitization outlined above (Balzacq, 
2015).  
Understanding securitization as a process or a mechanism, with the speech act 
becoming of lesser importance, we have to bear in mind that the kinds of evidence we are after 
is not as simple as ‘I hereby declare this a security matter’. In fact, the word security does not 
have to be uttered at all for a specific statement to add to a gradual buildup towards security, 
and clearly does not have to be mentioned in de-securitizing moves. Approaching energy 
securitization from this perspective helps us overcome the theoretical and methodological 
problem signaled earlier in this chapter, regarding the definition of a securitizing speech act. 
This idea is well captured by the empirical study by Fischhendler and Nathan (2014: 156), who 
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cast their net widely in a meticulous content analysis of committee public hearings. For them 
it was not ‘security’ as such, but ‘existential language’ that was the indicator of securitization 
– “a sense of urgency, prioritization, and/or survival, [expressions] centered on threat and risk” 
etc. 
What we are left with, however, is an unresolvable methodological question in the 
broader, philosophically derived sense of ‘methodology’ as proposed by Jackson (2011): do 
we want an explanatory theory of (energy) securitization? This is often a matter of individual 
preference, but there is also an important dividing line running between the philosophical and 
sociological approaches as well as the ‘thinner’ readings of the Copenhagen School. Floyd has 
argued against the inclusion of context in securitization as that “would change the theory 
beyond recognition, moving the focus away from the act that is securitization, toward a causal 
theory of securitization instead” (2010: 21). Yet this supposedly destructive move is, from a 
different point of view, the only sensible one, as securitization theory has arguably always been 
a causal theory. If anything, it carries a ‘hidden causal argument’ and an implicit explanatory 
aim (see Jackson 2017). Building on Balzacq and especially Guzzini’s proposals allows us to 
be more outspoken about the non-positivist causality of the securitization model, and explore 
the ways in which energy becomes security through interpretive process tracing, possibly in 
combination with other methods such as discourse or content analysis (Szulecki 2016). This 
will allow us to both understand specific examples of energy securitization, and explain how 
certain outcomes came about at that particular moment and in that context.  
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